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This study analyses bank efficiency in Vietnam from 1999 to 2009. We use a unique data sample that 
allows us to capture the development of the Vietnamese banking sector over the last decade. We apply 
an advanced methodological approach introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) to examine bank efficiency 
in Vietnam. An integral part of the analysis is to explore the determinants of bank efficiency. The results 
indicate that large and very large banks are more efficient than small and medium sized banks with small 
banks having the lowest efficiency scores in the system. We also argue that banks with large branch 
networks and those that have been in existence for a long time are less efficient than other banks.  
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Vietnam has become one of Asia's economic success stories in recent years with average economic 
growth of 7.8% per annum in the last decade.  After the recent global financial crisis, economic growth 
remains moderate and continues to come in below its potential. The Vietnamese banking system plays a 
key role in the economic system. The banking system is a backbone of the Vietnamese economy and 
contributes about 16% to 18% towards annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite the relatively long 
transition process of the banking system, Vietnamese banks are still undercapitalized. The regulatory 
reforms are rather slow, which remains a problem for its further development. Vietnamese banks operate 
in a challenging business environment that is characterized by tight credit margins and a large volume of 
non-performing loans (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007; KPMG, 2013; SBV, 2014 and WB, 2014). 3 
 
Efficiency at the unit level has become a contemporary major issue, due to the increasingly intense 
competition, globalization, technological innovation and increased deregulation Therefore it is important 
for banking regulators and market analysts to have sufficient relevant information that aids in the 
identification of actual or potential problems in the banking systems and individual banks. Such 
information is also valuable in order to compare competitiveness and efficiency of banking systems. If 
there is significant inefficiency in the sector, in general, and in different groups of banks, in particular, 
there may be room for structural changes, increased competition and mergers and acquisitions to 
enhance the efficiency and productivity of the banking system, and to speed up a country’s financial 
development and economic growth (Bonin et al., 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Staikouras et al., 2008; 
Huang et al., 2015 and Ghosh, 2015). 
 
                                                 
3
 On 1st March 2012, the plan on the restructuring of the system of credit institutions was approved by the Prime Minister under Decision 
No. 254/QD-TTg. The State Bank of Vietnam Governor later signed Decision No. 734/QD-NHNN setting the plan of action for the banking 
sector to implement Decision No. 254. These decisions are to prevent collapse and keep banking operations under state control. The process 
of reorganizing, strengthening and restructuring the credit institution system helps minimize losses and expenses incurred by the state 
budget for tackling the problems of the system. 
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There have been a few empirical studies that estimate bank efficiency in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen 
and De Borger, 2008). We contribute to this empirical literature by using an extensive panel data set of 48 
Vietnamese commercial banks during the period from 1999 to 2009. Such a large sample and relatively 
long period allow us to capture the changes over the financial crisis. No previous study of Vietnam uses 
such an extensive data set that covers before and during the global financial crisis. 
 
The objective of our study is threefold. First, we analyse bank efficiency in Vietnam by applying an 
advanced semi-parametric two stage method introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007). This approach 
enables us to obtain more reliable evidence compared to previous studies analysing bank efficiency 
(Barros et al., 2008).  Second, we identify the determinants of bank efficiency. Third, we provide a 
detailed analysis of bank efficiency for different ownership structures and bank size.  
 
Our results from the Simar and Wilson (2007) approach indicate that large and very large banks are more 
efficient than small and medium sized banks. Non-state owned commercial banks are more efficient than 
state owned commercial banks assuming overall efficiency. The number of branches and the number of 
years since establishment both have a negative and significant effect on efficiency. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the Vietnamese banking 
system in the period from 1986 to 2009 while section 3 provides a brief review of the previous empirical 
literature on bank efficiency. Section 4 focuses on methodology and data. Empirical results are presented 
in section 5 and section 6 provides a conclusion of the main findings. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009 
 
From 1986 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-tier banking system. 
The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam as the central bank (tier 1) and four 
specialised state owned banks (tier 2). Order No. 218/CT dated 23rd July 1987 was the first decision on the 
State Bank of Vietnam operation mechanism and organisation apparatus, turning the State Bank of 
Vietnam's branches into public commercial banks. After that, the Council of Ministers promulgated the 
Decision No. 53/HDBT on 26th March 1988. The first round of the reform had been completed with the 
launching of new business accounting mechanisms. This reform linked banking change to inflation 
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control. The state management of money, credit and banking services was clearly detached. The State 
Bank of Vietnam was only in charge of state management functions and all other banking institutes doing 
business. The function of the State Bank of Vietnam involved the monetary, credit and banking operation 
of the entire country so as to stabilise the value of the currency and promote economic growth. State 
owned banks became more independent and, in principle, more responsibility for their profits and losses 
that were not transferred to the State Bank of Vietnam as before (Kousted et al., 2005: 12). On 1st 
October 1990, the Decree-Laws on the State Bank and Decree-Laws on Banks, Credit Operatives and 
Finance Companies came into force and was the second round of reform, which led to the first 
appearance of joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and branches of foreign 
banks. 
 
In Table 1, we show a dynamic growth of commercial banks in Vietnam. With extended networks in 
almost all provinces and larger cities, state owned commercial banks have a competitive edge in providing 
banking services. Although joint stock commercial banks increased their numbers immediately after their 
appearance in 1990 (in 2009 there were 37 joint stock commercial banks), the leading positions in the 
market still belonged to state owned commercial banks. Three out of five state owned commercial banks 
accounted for 45% of customer deposits, 41% of total assets and 51% of customer loans of the banking 
system in 2009 (Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). State owned commercial banks were originally sector 
departments under the State Bank of Vietnam, with specified lending programmes to state owned 
enterprises which were based on government policies.  
 
Non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint stock commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, 
joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks4. Unlike state owned commercial banks a 
number of joint stock commercial banks make profits due to good performance. Joint stock commercial 
banks have achieved average returns on equity between 15% and 30% from 1999 to 2009. Being less than 
15 years old, joint stock commercial banks are relatively young and they can be divided into three groups: 
(1) the top five large urban banks; (2) a smaller group of banks that are either growing rapidly or have 
established a niche; and (3) twelve small rural joint stock commercial banks. The top five urban banks are, 
Techcombank, Sacombank, VIBBank, Asia Commercial Bank, and East Asia Commercial Bank. The smaller 
                                                 
4
 Foreign commercial banks normally transformed out of branches of foreign banks. Data on assets, loans and deposits of branches of foreign 
banks are very small compared to other banks. Therefore, in our application, non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint stock 
commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and one foreign commercial bank.  
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urban joint stock commercial banks include HabuBank, Viet A Bank and Saigon Bank. Small rural 
commercial banks were all transformed into city commercial banks at the end of 2010, such as, An Binh 
Bank, Saigon-Hanoi Bank, Petrolimex Group Bank, Dai A Bank, etc. These banks developed throughout the 
country, not just in rural areas, and with help from big business and foreign investors they also performed 
well in the 2000s. The number of branches of foreign banks increased from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks 
in 2009. However, each foreign bank normally has one branch in either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City. Hence, 
their assets, loans and deposits are very small compared to state owned commercial banks, joint stock 
commercial banks and joint venture commercial banks. Despite Foreign Direct Investment in US dollar 
terms growing by a factor of eight between 1990 and 2005, foreign companies are still hesitant in 
deciding whether or not to choose domestic banks when they enter this new market. The number of joint 
venture commercial banks has increased slightly from four to six banks between 1995 and 2009. The first 
foreign commercial bank (being HSBC) had a license to set up a wholly foreign-owned bank from 2008 
(Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). 
 
The credit growth rate of the banking system increased to 37.8% in 2007 and peaked at an alarming 63% 
in the first quarter of 2008 (WB, 2008: 3). This has been the highest growth rate within the past decade. 
When the inflation rate and trade balance deficit had become more serious, the government applied a 
traditional tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation, which affected the 
banking system. Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and strengthen their 
organisations.  
 
Table 2 shows data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese 
banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 
2009. On the whole, loans, assets, deposits and capital increased gradually over the period. Vietnamese 
banks were burdened by a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly during the 1990s; however 
these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of non-state owned commercial 
banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks.  
 
In terms of regulation, the State Bank of Vietnam aims to create a banking supervision development 
(following Basel) from 2010 onwards. Meanwhile, the coverage, measures and procedures of banking 
supervision and monitoring are to be reformed in accordance with the development of internet 
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technologies and banking technology. This will be done by applying key principles of international 
standards on banking supervision (Basel I and Basel II). The old capital adequacy ratio standards for banks 
in Basel I and Basel II are 8% and 12%, respectively. The capital adequacy ratio for the Vietnamese 
commercial banks is to be adjusted to 9% (as Circular No. 13/TT-NHNN dated 20th May 2010 of the State 
Bank of Vietnam).  
 
3. Literature review 
Empirical research on bank efficiency in transition economies has been intensive in last decade.  Bonin et 
al. (2005) applied a stochastic frontier approach to analyse the effects of bank ownership on bank 
efficiency and concluded that foreign banks are more cost-efficient than other banks. Fries and Taci 
(2005) also employed a stochastic frontier approach to investigate efficiency in 15 transition countries. 
They concluded that foreign banks show higher cost efficiency compared with domestic banks and that 
state-owned commercial banks exhibit the lowest efficiency among the group analysed. They stressed 
that cost efficiency of small- and medium- sized domestic banks differ significantly from foreign and state-
owned banks. Staikouras et al. (2008) analysed the cost efficiency by applying a stochastic frontier 
approach in six transition European countries over the period 1998-2003. They concluded that foreign 
banks and banks with higher foreign bank ownership involvement show higher efficiency. Huang et al. 
(2015) applied metafrontier directional technology distance function under a stochastic framework to 
examine and compare bank efficiencies of 17 Central and Eastern European countries from 1995 to 2007. 
They found that the estimated technology gap dominates technical efficiencies. Using data for 2000–
2012, Ghosh (2015) utilized the natural experiment of the Arab Spring to examine its impact on the risks 
and returns of the Middle East and North Africa banks. The analysis indicated that the Arab Spring 
lowered bank profitability by roughly 0.2% and raised bank risk by 0.4% points. 
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In Vietnam, after the transition in 1986 the empirical research on bank efficiency used a small 
unrepresentative number of banks and covered only a short time period. The problem of data collection 
made it difficult for researchers to investigate the issue through non-parametric methods. The research of 
Nguyen (2007) measured efficiency by employing data envelopment analysis (DEA). His research has been 
applied to a sample of only 13 banks in Vietnam over the period of 2001-2003. Nguyen and De Borger 
(2008) considered single bootstrap efficiency and the Malmquist Index for 15 banks for the period of 
2003-2006. No previous study has explicitly applied the double bootstrap method of Simar and Wilson 
(2007) on the Vietnamese banking system, our paper does. Vietnam’s economy in general and the 
banking system in particular faced difficult times in 2001 and 2008 (Global crisis). By restricting time 
spans, previous studies could not provide a comparative analysis of efficiency before and during the 
global financial crisis. In contrast, our more extensive data set is available before and during the global 
financial crisis period (1999 – 2009) and therefore can assess the impact of the crisis on efficiency.  
 
In addition, the previous research on Vietnamese banking efficiency did not consider state owned 
commercial banks as dominant in the banking system. The efficiency scores of banks by type (state owned 
commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) and asset size (small, medium, large and very 
large banks) have not been previously considered, whereas we do. Further, it has been suggested by 
various writers that researchers can adopt any measure of output for the financial firm as long as the 
measure is consistent with the researcher’s goal (Sealey and Lindley, 1977: 1252). Previous research on 
the Vietnamese banking system that has used core labour and deposits as inputs includes Nguyen (2007) 
and Nguyen and De Borger (2008). Nguyen (2007) employed the two outputs of interest and non-interest 
income and Nguyen and De Borger (2008) added consumer loans as an output. However, due to limited 
data, neither of these papers employed purchased funds data as an input or business loans data as an 
output, which we do. Our research is the first to estimate level of bank efficiency in Vietnam using all the 
required inputs and outputs as suggested by the intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Nguyen (2007) argued that the average cost efficiency of their sample of banks was about 60.6%, and the 
average annual growth of the Malmquist index5 was negative, being –2.2% over the study period. 
Conversely, total factor productivity increased by 5.7% between 2001 and 2003, while total factor 
productivity in 2003 was 15.1% higher than in 2002. This total factor productivity improvement was 
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 The Malmquist index is an extension of DEA. 
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achieved primarily by greater technical efficiency and, to some extent, by technological advancement. He 
also argued that the technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system declined from 0.912 in 2001 
to 0.895 in 2002. Nguyen and De Borger (2008) found that the productivity of Vietnamese banks tended 
to decrease over their (small) sample period, except for the year 2005 – although the bootstrapping 
results indicate that the productivity change between 2004 and 2005 was not significant. However, 
neither Nguyen (2007) or Nguyen and De Borger (2008) considered the impacts of explanatory variables 
on the inputs and outputs, whereas we do. 
 
The Simar and Wilson (2007) DEA bootstrap procedure for estimating efficiency has been applied recently 
by, for example, Barros et al. (2008), Brissimis et al. (2008) and Wijesiri et al. (2015). In the first stage, DEA 
is used to estimate the relative efficiency scores in the sample using, alternatively, constant returns to 
scale (Charnes et al., 1978) and variable returns to scale (Banker et al., 1984). In the second stage, the 
Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure is applied to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated regression. 
Using this approach enables us to obtain more reliable evidence compared to previous studies analysing 
bank efficiency (Barros et al., 2008). Firstly, the true efficiency score is not observed directly, rather it is 
empirically estimated. Secondly, the empirical estimates of the efficiency frontier are obtained based on 
the chosen sample of banks, thereby ruling out some efficiency production possibilities not observed in 
the sample (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Thirdly, the DEA two-stage procedure also depends upon other 
explanatory variables, which are not taken into account in the first-stage efficiency estimation. This 
implies that the error term must be correlated with the second-stage explanatory variables. Fourthly, the 
domain of the efficient score is restricted to the zero-one interval, which should be taken into account in 
the second-stage estimation stage. The method introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) overcomes these 
difficulties by adopting a procedure based on a double bootstrap that enables consistent inference within 
models and explains efficiency scores while simultaneously producing confidence intervals  (Barros et al., 
2008: 3-4). Therefore, bias-corrected double bootstrap efficiency methods are preferred for inference 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007). 
 
Based on Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double bootstrap procedure, Barros et al. (2008) investigated 
commercial banks operating in thirteen EU countries between 1993 and 2003. They found that legal 
tradition and foreign ownership have implications for public policy. Competition can be enhanced by 
policies designed to increase foreign bank penetration. Further, location does not affect performance 
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significantly. Instead efficiency is explained by bank size and the relative importance of a bank’s 
traditional activities. Brissimis et al. (2008) employed Simar and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrap procedure to 
examine 364 banks from ten newly acceded EU countries between 1994 and 2005. Their results indicate 
that both banking sector reform and competition exert a positive impact on bank efficiency, while the 
effect of reform on total factor productivity growth is significant only toward the end of the reform 
process. The effect of capital and credit risk on bank performance is in most cases negative, while it 
seems that higher liquid assets reduce efficiency. Wijesiri et al. (2015) examined 36 microfinance 
institutions in Sri Lanka. The results from the first stage indicate that many microfinance institutions do 
not escape criticism of financial and social inefficiency. The second stage regression reveals that age and 
capital-to-assets are significant determinants of financial efficiency whereas age, type of institution and 
return-on-assets are the crucial determinants of social efficiency. 
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
As discussed above we apply Simar and Wilson’s (2007) method in a two-stage procedure to estimate 
efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system. In the first stage, we adopt DEA to estimate the relative 
efficiency scores in the sample using, alternatively, constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale. 
In the second stage, we apply the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure to bootstrap the DEA scores with a 
truncated bootstrapped regression. We use both Algorithms 1 and 2 of Simar and Wilson (2007), which 
are discussed in the Appendix. The bias-corrected Algorithm 2 is preferred and used for inference (Simar 
and Wilson, 2007). Explanatory variables (assets, non-performing loans, branch networks, the number of 
years since establishment and city banks) are also included in the second stage for estimation. Efficiency 
scores are investigated using asset size (small, medium, large and very large banks) and bank type (state 
owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks and joint venture commercial banks). We 
investigate, using the semi-parametric model of Simar and Wilson (2007), the level of efficiency of the 
Vietnamese banking system as a whole and for the sub-samples: state owned commercial banks and non-
state owned commercial banks (joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and 
foreign commercial banks). This is the first time that an extensive panel data set has been employed to 
examine efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system. Our data set includes 48 Vietnamese commercial 
banks over the period 1999 to 2009.  
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4.1 Input and output specification 
 
There is no simple solution to the problem of input and output specification; reasonable arguments can 
be made for all approaches. There are two main approaches to the input and output specification of 
financial institutions, that is, the production approach and the intermediation approach (Matthews and 
Thompson, 2008). The production approach considers that banks produce accounts of various sizes by 
processing deposits and loans, incurring in capital and labour costs. Inputs are measured as operating 
costs and output is measured as number of deposits and loans accounts. The intermediation approach 
considers banks as transforming deposits and purchased funds into loans and other assets. Inputs are 
expressed as total operating costs plus interest costs and deposits while output is measured in money 
units.  
 
These two approaches have been applied in different ways depending on the availability of data and the 
purpose of the study. We assume that the Vietnamese banking system behaves as the transformer of 
deposits and purchased funds into customer loans and other loans. Therefore, we use the intermediation 
approach classified by Berger and Mester (1997). This choice is also due to the availability of data. All the 
data are indices of bank i in year t. Inputs are: (i) staff, measured by the number of employees; (ii) 
purchased funds are deposits from the State Bank of Vietnam and other banks in the system; and (iii) 
customer deposits (or core deposits), which are described as total deposits from corporate and private 
customers. Outputs include: (i) customer loans, which are total loans for the corporate and private 
sectors; (ii) other loans: all other loans except customer loans; and (iii) securities, defined as investment 
and trading securities of the bank (Berger and Mester, 1997). Table 3 reports the characteristics of inputs 
and outputs. The first column lists the names of the variables while columns 2 to 6 reports various 
statistics including the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value and maximum value.  
 
4.2 Bootstrap two-stage procedure 
 
In the first stage, the technical efficiency of banks is estimated, using DEA in order to establish which bank 
is the most efficient. Their rankings are based on productivity in the period 1999-2009. In the second 
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stage, the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure is used to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated 
bootstrapped regression (Barros et al., 2008 and Wijesiri et al., 2015).  
 
Stage 1 
 
Consider the jth bank with outputs and inputs Yrj, Xij (that are all positive) where Ur and Vi are the variable 
weights to be determined by the solution of the problem below (Charnes et al., 1978: 430). 
 
Max 

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The true efficiency score, 𝛿0, is not observed directly, rather it is empirically estimated. Many studies have 
used a two-stage approach, where efficiency is estimated in the first stage, and then the estimated 
efficiencies (or ratios of estimated efficiencies, Malmquist indices, and many others) are regressed on 
covariates (typically different from those used in the first stage) that are viewed as environmental 
variables (Simar and Wilson, 2007; Barros et al., 2008 and Wijesiri et al., 2015). Simar and Wilson (2007) 
criticised this two-stage method because the DEA efficiency estimates are biased and serially correlated, 
therefore invalidating conventional inferences in the second stage. Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed a 
procedure, based on a double bootstrap, which provides a confidence interval for the efficiency estimates 
and yields consistent inferences for factors explaining efficiency.  
 
Stage 2 
 
In this study, to implement the bootstrap procedure for DEA we assume that the original data is 
generated by a data generating process and that we are able to simulate this process by using a new 
(pseudo) data set that is drawn from the original data set (step 3.3 in Algorithm 2, which is discussed in 
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the Appendix). We then re-estimate the DEA model with this new data (steps 4 and 5 in Algorithm 2 – see 
the Appendix). By repeating this process 2000 times6 (step 2 in Algorithm 1 and step 6 in Algorithm 2 – 
see the Appendix) we are able to derive an empirical distribution of these bootstrap values (Balcombe et 
al., 2008 and Wijesiri et al., 2015). One hundred bootstrap replications are used to compute the bias-
corrected estimates ti ,


   (step 3 in Algorithm 2 below)7. The efficiency scores, 𝛿𝑖,𝑡, of bank i obtained in 
the first stage are regressed on explanatory variables in the second stage. However, these second-stage 
estimates are inconsistent and biased and a bootstrap procedure is needed to overcome this problem 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). The second stage regression is given by:  
 
iiti z  

,  (3) 
 
Or, equivalently: 
 
tititititititititi AGELNBRLNNLCLLNTALNCITYCOAROA ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,10, )()()()(  

 (4) 
 
Where: 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 represents the efficiency score, estimated in stage 1, and the other independent variables are 
environmental covariates. When using Algorithm 2, 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 is replaced by ti ,


 . Following Berger and Mester 
(1997), we employ seven explanatory variables in the second stage to determine the factors explaining 
bank efficiencies. The two financial variables are: (1) profit before tax divided by total assets (ROA) and (2) 
total costs divided by total assets (COA). Five other characteristics of banks are also considered. CITY is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank is transformed from a rural commercial bank to a city 
commercial bank and zero otherwise. This variable aims to capture efficiency related to transforming 
banks. LN(TA) is the natural logarithm of total assets and LN(BR) is the natural logarithm of total branches 
and these provide information about the relationships between efficiency and assets as well as efficiency 
and branch networks, respectively. LN(AGE) is the natural logarithm of the number of years the bank 
existed before 2009. Lastly, LN(NLCL) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of non-performing loans to 
                                                 
6
 This number of bootstrap replications is used to construct estimated confidence intervals in the two algorithms. Confidence-interval 
estimation is tantamount to estimating the tails of distributions, which necessarily requires more information. Hall (1986) suggested 1,000 
replications for estimating confidence intervals. We followed Simar and Wilson (2007) and use 2,000 replications in our simulations. More 
accurate estimates can be achieved with a larger number of replications. However, the calculation time also rises when number of 
replications increase (Simar and Wilson, 2007: 44). 
7
 Simar and Wilson (2007: 44) found that 100 replications are sufficient to compute the bias-corrected estimates which require only 
computation of a mean and then a difference.  
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customer loans. More details of environmental variables can be found in Berger and Mester (1997). 
Summary statistics on these variables over our sample are presented in Table 4. 
 
Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals of the coefficients estimated in the second stage regression can 
be constructed as follows: 
 
   1)(Pr ,, jjj UpperLowerob  
 
 
where is some small value representing the probability of a Type I error (for example, 05.0  for a 5% 
level of significance) and 10  . jLower ,  and jUpper ,  are calculated using the empirical intervals 
obtained from the bootstrap values, thus: 
 
  


1)(Pr * abob jj  
 
where 



  bUpper jj,  and 



  aLower jj, . 
 
4.3. Data 
 
We have collected a unique dataset for Vietnamese commercial banks. Our dataset includes 48 
Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. The data has been collected from the State 
Bank of Vietnam and through the annual reports of individual banks. This data set accounts for more than 
90% of total customer loans, total customer deposits and total assets. Five of the 48 banks are state 
owned commercial banks, five are joint venture commercial banks, one is a foreign commercial bank and 
the remaining 37 are joint stock commercial banks. Several banks established in 2008 and 2009 are 
included in the data. The number of records each year ranged from a low of 17 banks in 1999 to a high of 
46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies of years in the data, see Table 1. There are sixteen banks 
with data for all years; twelve banks with 4–8 years of data; fourteen banks with 5–7 years of data and 
five banks with 2–4 years of data (of which three banks were established in 2008 and one bank was 
founded in 2006). Only one bank (which was transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign 
commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
5. Empirical results  
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5.1. Efficiency scores 
 
In Table 5 we present our estimated efficiency scores. The top half of the table reports scores based upon 
constant returns to scale (CCR) and the lower half gives efficiency measures using variable returns to scale 
(BCC). The average initial technical efficiency score 




 
ti,  for the whole system is 0.74 assuming constant 
returns to scale and 0.81 assuming variable returns to scale. From these initial estimates, we apply both 
Algorithms 1 (to obtain *,ti ) and 2 









ti ,  using Simar and Wilson’s (2007) method. The two bootstrapping 
methods produce similar results. Simar and Wilson (2007) pointed out that Algorithm 2 involves only a 
small increase in computational burden over Algorithm 1 and that the improved performance of 
Algorithm 2 justifies its use. Results based on Monte Carlo simulation suggest that we should prefer the 
results from Algorithm 2 over those from Algorithm 1 (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Hence, we favour these 
bias-corrected double bootstrap scores and use them for inference.  
 
The average double bootstrap technical efficiency score obtained from Algorithm 2 










ti ,  for the whole 
system is 0.68 assuming constant returns to scale (CCR) and 0.75 assuming variable returns to scale (BCC). 
In 1999 efficiency scores for the whole system were the lowest for the period we cover, being 0.54 (CCR) 
and 0.58 (BCC). These scores steadily rose to 0.82 (CCR) and 0.90 (BCC) by 2009 demonstrating a 
substantial increase in the efficiency of the banking system over the period – the peak scores are 0.83 for 
the CCR measure in 2007 and 0.90 for the BCC measure in 2009. From the column headed “Number of 
efficient banks” in Table 5 both CCR and BCC measures indicate that only one bank (being the Export 
Import Commercial Bank) out of a total of seventeen banks was on the efficient frontier in 1999. 
According to the CCR (BCC) efficiency measure 8 (21) out of 46 banks were on the efficient frontier in 
2009. This confirms the general increase in banking efficiency over the period. The BCC score measures 
pure technical efficiency reflecting management skills and its average score is higher than for the CCR 
measure.8 On the other hand the CCR score measures overall technical efficiency. The ratio of the CCR 
                                                 
8
 While the DEA CCR and BCC measures indicate some differences in efficiency patterns there is a clear general positive correlation between 
them, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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and BCC measures enables the estimation of scale efficiency that reflects both managerial skills and scale 
effects. 
 
Efficiency in the whole banking system did not unambiguously rise every year: the two exceptions being 
2001–2002 and 2007–2008. Between 2001 and 2002 the CCR efficiency score remained unchanged at 
0.59 (although the BCC measure rose from 0.64 to 0.67). Nguyen (2007) also found that Vietnamese 
banking efficiency did not rise in this period, indeed, his results indicated a decline from 0.912 in 2001 to 
0.895 in 2002. His results were based upon input and output data for thirteen commercial banks whereas 
our results are based on a much larger sample of 25 – 27 banks in this period. We therefore believe our 
results to be more reliable and infer that Nguyen (2007) exaggerates the decline in efficiency in this 
period. Nevertheless, we find that the number of banks on the efficient frontier fell from 4 (5) in 2001 to 
0 (3) in 2002 according to the CCR (BCC) measure. We note that during this period of the development of 
the banking system there was a passage of banking reform in 2002 which could have affected bank 
efficiency. Further, non-performing loans still accounted for 7.06% of total loans in 2002 before sharply 
plummeting to 4.74% in 2003 (SBV, 2009).  
 
The CCR (BCC) efficiency score fell from 0.83 (0.89) in 2007 to 0.80 (0.88) in 2008. Prior to 2006 the 
average growth of GDP was 7.8% per year. GDP growth was 8.5% and 6.2% in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The banking system had provided a great capital source for the economy, making up 
approximately 16% – 18% of GDP annually, which was almost equivalent to 50% of the total investment 
capital of the whole country. However, the global financial crisis that began at the end of 2007 and the 
beginning of 2008 appears to have had an impact on the efficiency scores. The banking system 
encountered many difficulties, resulting from a loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the 
rapid increase in credit growth. Moreover, tightening monetary policy caused many banks to become 
weaker. After 2008, the Vietnamese economy, in parallel with the global economy, recovered and this is 
reflected in the 2009 efficiency scores. The CCR (BBC) score increases from 0.80 (0.88) in 2008 to 0.82 
(0.90) in 2009. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report ti ,


  average efficiency scores categorised by asset size and bank type. In Table 6, 
total assets in 2009 are used to group banks into small (assets less than 20,000 billion Vietnamese Dong), 
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medium (assets from 20,000 to 50,000 billion Vietnamese Dong), large (assets from 50,000 to 100,000 
billion Vietnamese Dong) and very large (assets more than 100,000 billion Vietnamese Dong) categories. 
The results indicate that large and very large banks are more efficient than small and medium banks 
because they generally have larger values of .  
 
Very large banks include the four biggest state owned commercial banks and two biggest joint stock 
commercial banks (namely the Asia Commercial Bank and Sacombank) in terms of customer loans, total 
assets and customer deposits. Large banks comprise the five big joint stock commercial banks: 
Techcombank, Export-Import Bank, Military Bank, Maritime Banks, and Vibbank. Medium banks contain 
the remaining state owned commercial banks, and the five other joint stock commercial banks. Small 
banks are all of the joint venture commercial banks and newly established banks. Large banks have the 
highest average CCR efficiency measure (being 0.73) throughout the 11 years. The CCR average efficiency 
score of very large banks (0.71) is lower than that of large banks but their BCC average score is much 
higher (being 0.86 compared to 0.78). Three banks in the very large group, including the Bank for Foreign 
Trade, Asia Commercial Bank and Sacombank, received awards from foreign organisations regarding their 
business. Small banks and medium sized banks have average efficiency scores that are similar (both are 
0.65 according to the CCR measure and 0.70 and 0.71, respectively, for the BCC measure). Medium sized 
banks and large banks were strongly affected by the crisis in 2008 with their efficiency scores falling 
substantially between 2007 and 2008. The CCR (BCC) efficiency score of medium sized banks declined 
from 0.84 (0.93) in 2007 to 0.77 (0.88) in 2008 and 0.75 (0.85) in 2009. Large bank CCR efficiency scores 
fell from 0.86 (0.94) to 0.80 (0.90) between 2007 and 2008 although they recovered to 0.87 (0.95) in 
2009. The crisis had a more modest impact on very large banks with CCR efficiency scores falling from 
0.83 to 0.81 between 2007 and 2008 while the BCC measure remained unchanged at 0.94 during the 
same period. Small bank efficiency was not adversely affected by the crisis with the CCR measure 
unchanged at 0.81 between 2007 and 2008 and the BCC score rising from 0.85 to 0.87 in this period. Both 
small and very large banks efficiency scores rose (according to both measures) between 2008 and 2009. 
Small banks and medium sized banks generally have lower efficiency scores than large and very large 
banks. 
 
ti ,



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In Table 7 we present efficiency measures by bank type. It is evident that joint venture commercial banks 
have the highest average CCR score of 0.74 followed by state owned commercial banks with a score of 
0.70 and joint stock commercial banks with a score of 0.67. However, state owned commercial banks 
have the highest average efficiency score according to the BCC measure, being 0.86, followed by joint 
venture commercial banks with a score of 0.77 and joint stock commercial banks with a score of 0.72. 
Joint stock commercial banks are by far the most numerous in the banking system and their average score 
seems to be affected by some small and inefficient banks. Non-state owned commercial banks (joint stock 
commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks) have an average CCR 
(BCC) efficiency score of 0.72 (0.76), see the footnote of Table 7, while the corresponding score for state 
owned commercial banks is 0.70 (0.86). This indicates that the state owned commercial banks have 
higher managerial skills (what BCC measures) if they are less efficient assuming overall technical efficiency 
(what CCR measures) compared with non-state owned commercial banks.  
 
In the first period where bank efficiency of the whole banking system did not rise (being 2001 – 2002) we 
find the following patterns by bank type. Joint stock commercial banks were the only bank type whose 
efficiency did not rise between 2001 and 2002, the CCR efficiency score fell from 0.57 in 2001 to 0.55 in 
2002 while the BCC score remained unchanged at 0.59 in this period. Hence, joint stock commercial banks 
are primarily responsible for the decline in the overall banking system’s efficiency at this time. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency scores of state owned commercial banks and joint venture commercial banks 
only rose gradually in this period, suggesting a more general malaise in efficiency at this time.  
 
In the global financial crisis period of 2007 – 2008 there is clear evidence that the efficiency scores of joint 
stock commercial banks declined and some evidence, if ambiguous, that state owned commercial banks 
efficiency deteriorated. The CCR (BCC) efficiency scores of joint stock commercial banks declined sharply 
from 0.83 (0.90) to 0.78 (0.86) between 2007 and 2008. The CCR efficiency measure of state owned 
commercial banks fell from 0.87 in 2007 to 0.86 in 2008 whereas the BCC score rose from 0.98 in 2007 to 
1.00 in 2008. However, unlike the other two bank types the efficiency score for state owned commercial 
banks did not recover in 2009 with the CCR measure falling to 0.83 – the BCC measure remained 
unchanged at 1.00. This suggests that state owned commercial banks delayed recovery from the crisis 
was not due to weakness of managerial skills (BCC) rather it was because of their leading role in the 
economy of deposits and loans weakening. In contrast, joint venture commercial banks’ CCR (BCC) 
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efficiency score dramatically increased from 0.75 (0.78) in 2007 to 0.89 (0.90) in 2008. These episodes 
confirm the general relative weakness of joint stock commercial banks in terms of efficiency. 
 
Table 8 shows the efficiency scores of each of the 48 Vietnamese banks averaged over the period 1999 to 
2009, assuming constant returns to scale (CCR), variable returns to scale (BCC) and scale efficiency. Only 
two joint stock commercial banks (being the TienPhong Bank and BaoViet Bank) and one foreign 
commercial bank (HSBC Vietnam) are on the efficient frontier (with an efficiency score of 1.00) during our 
sample period. It should be noted that TienPhong Bank and BaoViet Bank were both established in 2008 
while HSBC Vietnam transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank in 2009. 
While other longer established banks have been on the efficient frontier in some years their average 
scores are lower than those of the newly found banks. As discussed above, during the periods 2001–2002 
and 2007–2008 almost all banks efficiency scores fell. While some banks are efficient in certain years the 
average scores over the whole period indicate that all banks are relatively inefficient (or have experienced 
periods of relative inefficiency).  
 
5.2. Regression results on environmental variables 
 
In this section, we regress the favoured DEA efficiency scores on our environmental variables (using the 
model specified in (4) except with ti ,


  as the dependent variable) and obtain the coefficients shown in 
the second (CCR) and third (BCC) columns of Table 9.9  
 
Regarding the control variables, profit before tax divided by total assets (ROA) has a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 5% level for both measures of efficiency. This implies that banks with a high 
ratio of profit over assets are likely to be more efficient than others. Total costs divided by total assets 
(COA) is not a significant determinant of efficiency for both the CCR and BCC measures. Thus, banks with 
                                                 
9
 We do not believe that the results reported in Table 9 are subject to the adverse effects of multicollinearity for the following reasons. First, 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the models’ 7 regressors are less than 10 which, according to Klein’s rule of thumb, suggest that none 
are highly collinear. Second, the two most likely variables to be subject to multicollinearity are LNTA and LNBR because they have the highest 
VIFs: for LNTA VIF = 3.97 and for LNBR VIF = 3.85. These covariates having the only pairwise simple correlation coefficient that exceed 0.8 
(being 0.82) confirms this – only 3 pairings have correlation coefficients greater than 0.3. Since both LNTA and LNBR are statistically 
significant when CCR is the dependent variable this suggests that multicollinearity is not making significant variables appear insignificant 
(which is the main adverse consequence of multicollinearity). When BCC is the dependent variable LNBR is significant, suggesting that this 
variable has not been adversely affected by multicollinearity, however LNTA is insignificant. We believe the insignificance of LNTA is not the 
result of multicollinearity because LNTA is not adversely affected by multicollinearity when CCR is the dependent variable and because LNBR 
is not subject to the adverse effects of multicollinearity. Third, multicollinearity is known to be a small sample problem and our sample size of 
379 observations is sufficiently large to diminish any adverse effects of multicollinearity on our results. 
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relatively high costs are no more or less efficient than those with lower costs. Total assets (LNTA) and the 
variable that identifies institutions that transformed from rural to city commercial banks (CITY) both have 
a positive and significant coefficient in the regression for the CCR efficiency score, however, neither are 
significant determinants of the BCC efficiency score. Hence, raising total assets appears to be an effective 
tool for increasing overall technical bank efficiency (which CCR measures) if not managerial skills (which 
BCC measures). Further, the ten or so institutions that transformed from rural commercial banks to city 
commercial banks in the 2000s have also significantly raised overall technical bank efficiency if not 
managerial skills. The non-performing loans variable (LNNLCL) is an insignificant determinant of both 
measures of efficiency. In contrast, the number of branches (LNBR) and the number of years since 
establishment (LNAGE) both have negative and significant coefficients in the equations for both efficiency 
measures. This indicates that banks with a relatively small number of branch networks (such as joint 
venture commercial banks or newly established banks) and those that have been in existence for a 
comparatively short period of time are more efficient than older banks and those with larger branch 
networks. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The results of our analysis suggest that the average technical efficiency score for the whole Vietnamese 
banking system using the traditional method is 0.74 for the constant returns to scale measure and 0.81 
with the variable returns to scale measure. These values are 0.68 and 0.75, respectively, after applying 
Simar and Wilson’s (2007) superior double bootstrap method. These more accurate estimates indicate a 
lower level of efficiency compared with the traditionally used method. We find that while bank efficiency 
generally rose over the period it did not increase every year, for example, between 2001 and 2002 as well 
as 2007 and 2008. For 2001 – 2002 our finding is consistent with the results obtained by Nguyen (2007) in 
the sense that overall efficiency (CCR) does not rise, although we do not observe the clear decline in 
efficiency that he identifies. We believe our inference is more accurate because it is based on a 
substantially larger sample of banks and a superior estimation method. Between 2007 and 2008, a period 
that has not been examined previously, we find that efficiency declined according to both measures (CCR 
and BCC) and attribute this to the effect of the global financial crisis on the banking system.  
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In terms of asset size, large and very large banks are, on average, more efficient than small and medium 
sized banks. Regarding bank type, joint venture commercial banks exhibit greater overall efficiency (CCR 
measure) than state owned commercial banks that, in turn, are more efficient than joint stock 
commercial banks. However, the ranking according to the BCC measure, which distils managerial skills, is 
that state owned commercial banks are the most efficient, followed by joint venture commercial banks 
and then joint stock commercial banks. Non-state owned commercial banks (being joint stock commercial 
banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks) are more efficient than state 
owned commercial banks assuming overall efficiency. The average BCC efficiency scores of state owned 
commercial banks (0.86) are higher than for non-state owned commercial banks (0.76) suggesting the 
former exhibit superior efficiency in terms of managerial skills. However, the average CCR efficiency 
measure of non-state owned commercial banks (0.72) is higher than that of state owned commercial 
banks (0.70) indicating that the former have, on average, greater overall technical efficiency than the 
latter. 
 
The Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap efficiency scores are then regressed on environmental 
variables to identify the main determinants of efficiency. Generally, banks with greater total assets and 
those that transformed from rural to city commercial banks significantly raise overall efficiency (the CCR 
measure), if they have no significant impact on managerial skills (the BCC measure). Banks with a greater 
ratio of profit before tax to total assets are significantly more efficient than those with a lower ratio for 
both efficiency measures. The number of branches and the number of years since establishment both 
have a negative and significant effect on (both measures of) efficiency. Hence, banks with fewer branch 
networks (such as joint venture commercial banks or newly established banks) and those that have been 
in existence for a shorter period of time are more efficient than other banks. The non-performing loans, 
costs divided by total assets and profit before tax divided by total assets variables are not significant 
determinants of either measure of efficiency.  
 
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. The first policy implication concerns the small 
banks (in terms of asset size) in the system. The results indicate that large and very large banks are more 
efficient than small and medium sized banks with small banks having the lowest efficiency scores in the 
system. This suggests that efficiency can be raised by restructuring the banking system to reduce the 
number of smaller, less efficient banks. Moreover, banks with large branch networks and those that have 
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been in existence for a long time are less efficient than other banks. This also aligns with recent policies 
from the State Bank of Vietnam to promote mergers and acquisitions, increasing the financial autonomy 
of banks. The State Bank of Vietnam has targeted 6 to 7 mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector in 
2014, and a 50% reduction in the number of commercial banks in the period of 2015-2017 (WB, 2014). 
 
Our results also indicate that non-state owned commercial banks exhibit greater overall technical 
efficiency (based on the CCR measure) than state owned commercial banks. Thus, the State Bank of 
Vietnam could improve efficiency by considering policies to enhance the development of the non-state 
owned commercial banks in the system. The recent restructuring plan allows the State Bank of Vietnam 
to intervene in weak credit institutions, leading to the quick and thorough handling of these credit 
institutions. The State Bank of Vietnam also focuses on non-performing loans of state owned commercial 
banks with various measures, including deciding the real estate market, solving inventories for 
enterprises and promoting the restructuring of state enterprises (SBV, 2014). 
 
We stress the limitations of our study. Although, we have set up a unique database, there is a possibility 
to collect data of the branches of foreign banks even though they account for only a small percentage of 
the banking system in terms of loans, deposits and assets. The full data might help us to provide more 
exact results of the efficiency scores. The next step should be to investigate bank efficiency of newly set 
up commercial banks and the “old” banks.  This considers not only ownership structure matters but also 
the differences in terms of bank efficiency between “new” and “old” banks. 
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I.I. Algorithm 1 
 
 
Step 1 Using original data of outputs, Yrj, and inputs, Xij, (that are all positive) compute DEA efficiency 
scores i

  
Step 2 Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate 

  of β as well as an estimate 

 of 
 in the truncated regression of i

  on zi (equation (3)) using m<n observations where 1
^
i .  
Step 3 Loop over the next three steps ([3.1]-[3.3]) 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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I.I. Algorithm 2 
 
 
Step 1 Using original data of outputs, Yrj, and inputs, Xij, (that are all positive) compute DEA efficiency 
scores i

 . 
Step 2 Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate 

  of β as well as an estimate 

of 
 in the truncated regression of i

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Step 3 Loop over the next four steps ([3.1]-[3.4]) 100 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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[3.4] Compute the new technical efficiency 
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Step 6 Loop over the next three steps ([6.1]-[6.3]) 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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Figure 1 Scatter plot of DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC efficiency scores 
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Table 1 The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 2009
10
 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks  4 4 5 5 5 
Non-state owned commercial banks      
                  Joint stock commercial banks  0 36 39 37 37 
                  Branches of foreign banks  0 18 26 31 48 
                  Joint venture commercial banks  0 4 5 5 6 
                  Foreign commercial banks  0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: SBV (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese commercial banks (state owned 
commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009 (Unit: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong) 
                                                 
10
 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating as non-profit 
institutions. 
27 
 
Year Bank type Loans Assets Deposits  Capital Non-performing 
loans 
1999 
 SOCBs     72,142,247      134,890,858       87,326,439       5,468,772  10.78% 
 Non-SOCBs     35,899,360        58,871,839       30,293,986       9,284,887  N/A 
2000 
 SOCBs   108,422,565      200,433,947     127,033,459       5,413,772  10.02% 
 Non-SOCBs     41,231,535        75,856,994       43,321,781     10,139,627  9.42% 
2001 
 SOCBs   135,647,621      247,151,769     160,738,302       5,421,134  8.83% 
 Non-SOCBs     45,466,715        88,614,974       51,759,565     10,953,034  7.81% 
2002 
 SOCBs   165,921,733      286,860,920     189,313,313     10,061,113  7.62% 
 Non-SOCBs     55,296,802      102,590,591       63,658,203     11,152,585  5.41% 
2003 
 SOCBs   214,481,096      367,813,825     237,485,761     14,516,916  5.13% 
 Non-SOCBs     74,068,790      130,337,981       79,255,399     12,398,334  3.57% 
2004 
 SOCBs   295,738,175      468,341,918     311,681,861     17,362,940  2.92% 
 Non-SOCBs   103,563,777      183,404,071     109,681,322     14,860,054  2.26% 
2005 
 SOCBs   380,850,503      603,540,889     406,957,181     18,429,980  3.81% 
 Non-SOCBs   143,449,737      261,307,537     144,499,838     20,009,805  1.42% 
2006 
 SOCBs   435,695,864      731,657,400     524,533,245     18,777,200  3.19% 
 Non-SOCBs   212,097,344      430,755,234     229,411,786     35,578,494  1.29% 
2007 
 SOCBs   564,677,195      904,004,852     652,913,108     30,091,997  1.87% 
 Non-SOCBs   420,184,441      903,961,807     456,920,152     66,066,418  0.94% 
2008 
 SOCBs   671,732,670   1,078,729,233     775,560,005     39,279,325  2.47% 
 Non-SOCBs   534,692,051   1,097,675,565     593,628,040   103,923,040  1.62% 
2009
11
 
 SOCBs   903,718,777   1,320,357,324     869,410,909     61,293,664  N/A 
 Non-SOCBs   560,883,667   1,210,244,318     680,665,451   115,192,318  N/A 
Note: SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks. Sources: SBV (2009); Financial statements of 
48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs (Units: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong except for Staff) 
 
Variables Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
1. Staff (People) 
2. Purchased Funds 
3. Customer Deposits 
 
2,363.59 
4,717,463.63 
16,876,982.94 
 
485 
953,304 
2,801,850 
 
5,380.34 
9,114,539.41 
39,407,328.37 
 
31 
0 
796 
 
35,135 
65,317,125 
34,964,4191 
Outputs 
4. Customer Loans 
5. Other Loans 
6. Securities 
 
15,412,044.60 
5,603,227.19 
3,182,009.32 
 
2,642,000 
1,029,387 
189,737 
 
39,384,206.14 
11,005,779.19 
7,871,634.06 
 
496 
226 
0 
 
372,438,322 
72,637,734 
44,573,879 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
                                                 
11
 We could not collect data of the North Asia Commercial Bank and Vinasiam Bank in 2009. 
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Variables Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Raw data 
1. ROA 
2. COA 
 
 
0.01 
0.07 
 
0.01 
0.06 
 
0.02 
0.06 
 
-0.09 
0 
 
0.30 
1.24 
Other characteristics 
4. CITY  (Dummy) 
5. LNTA 
6. LNNLCL 
7. LNBR 
8. LNAGE 
 
0.18 
15.43 
-4.28 
3.27 
2.68 
 
0 
15.29 
-4.28 
3.22 
2.77 
 
0.39 
1.96 
1.14 
1.52 
0.48 
 
0 
8.57 
-8.81 
0 
0 
 
1 
20 
0 
7.74 
3.09 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
 
 
Table 5: Technical efficiency average scores for the whole Vietnamese banking sector: 
^
,ti , 
*
,ti  and ti ,


  
 ^
,ti  
*
,ti  Algorithm 1, 
*
,ti  
Confidence interval 
ti ,


  Algorithm 2, ti ,


  
Confidence interval 
Number 
of banks 
Number of 
efficient banks 
CCR   Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
1999 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.64 0.54 0.46 0.63 17 1 
2000 0.66 0.55 0.50 0.67 0.56 0.47 0.66 22 1 
2001 0.67 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.59 0.56 0.67 25 4 
2002 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.67 0.59 0.52 0.66 27 0 
2003 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.69 0.60 0.52 0.68 28 2 
2004 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.77 39 2 
2005 0.78 0.70 0.66 0.82 0.72 0.66 0.81 41 4 
2006 0.80 0.73 0.70 0.86 0.76 0.68 0.85 41 7 
2007 0.87 0.78 0.76 0.92 0.83 0.75 0.91 44 9 
2008 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.90 0.80 0.72 0.90 46 8 
2009 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.92 46 8 
Mean 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.78 0.68 0.61 0.77 34.18 4.18 
 ^
,ti  
*
,ti  Algorithm 1, 
*
,ti  
Confidence interval 
ti ,


  Algorithm 2, ti ,


  
Confidence interval 
Number 
of banks 
Number of 
efficient banks 
BCC   Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound  
1999 0.65 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.58 0.50 0.67 17 1 
2000 0.68 0.59 0.54 0.71 0.60 0.51 0.70 22 2 
2001 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.72 25 5 
2002 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.74 27 3 
2003 0.75 0.68 0.63 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.76 28 4 
2004 0.84 0.76 0.72 0.87 0.77 0.71 0.87 39 5 
2005 0.87 0.77 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.72 0.87 41 8 
2006 0.89 0.80 0.77 0.90 0.83 0.75 0.89 41 10 
2007 0.93 0.84 0.82 0.94 0.89 0.81 0.93 44 18 
2008 0.92 0.83 0.82 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.95 46 13 
2009 0.95 0.87 0.83 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.96 46 21 
Mean 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.82 34.18 8.18 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009.
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Table 6 Technical efficiency scores as the double bootstrap method ( ti ,


 ) in terms of asset size in 2009 
   
 
Years 
Small banks 
(Asset: 0-20,000 
billion VND) 
Medium banks 
(Asset: 20,000-50,000 
billion VND) 
Large banks 
(Asset: 50,000-100,000 
billion VND) 
Very large banks 
(Asset: More than 100,000 
billion VND) 
CCR BCC CCR BCC CCR BCC CCR BCC 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
0.51 
0.49 
0.56 
0.55 
0.55 
0.66 
0.72 
0.73 
0.81 
0.81 
0.83 
0.52 
0.50 
0.57 
0.59 
0.64 
0.74 
0.74 
0.77 
0.85 
0.87 
0.89 
0.46 
0.49 
0.46 
0.50 
0.60 
0.68 
0.72 
0.83 
0.84 
0.77 
0.75 
0.47 
0.50 
0.47 
0.54 
0.65 
0.81 
0.80 
0.87 
0.93 
0.88 
0.85 
0.71 
0.76 
0.68 
0.62 
0.59 
0.70 
0.73 
0.75 
0.86 
0.80 
0.87 
0.71 
0.78 
0.71 
0.67 
0.62 
0.74 
0.78 
0.83 
0.94 
0.90 
0.95 
0.49 
0.58 
0.68 
0.73 
0.70 
0.69 
0.73 
0.77 
0.83 
0.81 
0.85 
0.63 
0.69 
0.82 
0.93 
0.86 
0.85 
0.89 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.99 
Mean 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.86 
 
Table 7 Technical efficiency scores as the double bootstrap method ( ti ,


 ) in terms of bank type 
 
 
Years 
State owned banks 
 
Joint stock banks 
 
Joint venture banks 
 
CCR BCC Banks CCR BCC Banks CCR BCC Banks 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
0.52 
0.51 
0.59 
0.63 
0.66 
0.68 
0.74 
0.84 
0.87 
0.86 
0.83 
0.64 
0.63 
0.73 
0.84 
0.83 
0.89 
0.94 
0.99 
0.98 
1.00 
1.00 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
0.54 
0.56 
0.57 
0.55 
0.57 
0.68 
0.71 
0.75 
0.83 
0.78 
0.80 
0.56 
0.58 
0.59 
0.59 
0.60 
0.75 
0.75 
0.80 
0.90 
0.86 
0.88 
10 
14 
16 
19 
20 
31 
32 
31 
34 
36 
37 
0.54 
0.69 
0.69 
0.71 
0.72 
0.68 
0.82 
0.77 
0.75 
0.89 
0.92 
0.55 
0.70 
0.71 
0.74 
0.79 
0.72 
0.85 
0.85 
0.78 
0.90 
0.92 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Mean 0.70 0.86  0.67 0.72  0.74 0.77  
Note: In 2009, HSBC (foreign commercial bank) had average efficiency score of 1 for both CCR and BCC; Mean of non-state owned 
commercial banks (joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks: CCR (0.72) and BCC (0.76); 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
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Table 8 Technical efficiency average scores as the double bootstrap method ( ) for the Vietnamese banking 
system from 1999 to 2009 
ID Bank in groups DEA-CCR DEA-BCC DEA-Scale Index 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
 
48 
State Owned Commercial Banks (5 banks) 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development  
Bank for Investment and Development  
Mekong Housing Bank 
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 
Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade 
Joint Stock Commercial Banks (37 banks)  
Asia Commercial Bank 
Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Bank(*) 
Technological and Commercial Bank Vietnam 
Export Import Bank 
Military Commercial Bank 
Dong A Commercial Bank 
Saigon Commercial Joint Stock Bank(**)  
Vietnam International Commercial Bank(*)  
Hanoi Building Commercial JS Bank  
Maritime Commercial Bank 
South East Asia Commercial Bank(**)  
Vietnam Prosperity Commercial Bank 
Southern Commercial Bank 
Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade 
Orient Commercial Bank(*) 
North Asia Commercial Bank(**) 
Housing Development Commercial Bank(*)  
Nam A Commercial Bank(*) 
Vietnam Tin Nghia Commercial Bank(**)  
Gia Dinh Commercial Bank(**) 
Kien Long Commercial Bank(*)  
First Commercial Bank(***) 
An Binh Commercial Bank(**) 
Saigon-Hanoi Commercial Bank(**)  
Ocean Commercial Bank(**) 
Viet A Commercial Bank(*)  
Nam Viet Commercial Bank(**)   
Global Petro Commercial Bank(**) 
Petrolimex Group Commercial Bank(*)  
Great Trust Commercial Bank(**)  
Great Asia Commercial Bank(**)  
Western Commercial Bank(*) 
Mekong Development Bank(*) 
Lien Viet Bank (***Established in 2008)  
Tien Phong Bank (***Established in 2008) 
Vietnam Thuong Tin Bank(***Established in 2006)  
Bao Viet Bank(****Established  in 2008) 
Joint Venture Commercial Banks (5 banks)  
Indovina Bank 
Shinhanvina Bank(*)  
VID Public Bank 
Vinasiam Bank(*)  
Vietnam Russia Bank(**) 
Foreign Commercial Bank (1 bank)  
HSBC Vietnam(****Established  in 2009) 
 
0.57 
0.76 
0.66 
0.83 
0.69 
 
0.82 
0.63 
0.66 
0.79 
0.81 
0.54 
0.91 
0.58 
0.79 
0.73 
0.93 
0.56 
0.49 
0.61 
0.53 
0.87 
0.71 
0.52 
0.80 
0.75 
0.45 
0.88 
0.82 
0.71 
0.89 
0.61 
0.82 
0.81 
0.72 
0.64 
0.83 
0.76 
0.72 
0.94 
1.00 
0.88 
1.00 
 
0.80 
0.76 
0.67 
0.85 
0.67 
 
1.00 
 
0.86 
0.91 
0.76 
0.93 
0.86 
 
0.89 
0.75 
0.72 
0.84 
0.86 
0.63 
0.93 
0.66 
0.82 
0.78 
0.96 
0.62 
0.57 
0.67 
0.60 
0.90 
0.74 
0.56 
0.81 
0.78 
0.49 
0.88 
0.90 
0.76 
0.98 
0.66 
0.89 
0.90 
0.93 
0.70 
0.87 
0.79 
0.73 
0.94 
1.00 
0.90 
1.00 
 
0.81 
0.83 
0.68 
0.86 
0.79 
 
1.00 
 
0.65 
0.83 
0.87 
0.89 
0.79 
 
0.92 
0.83 
0.92 
0.92 
0.94 
0.87 
0.98 
0.90 
0.96 
0.94 
0.96 
0.91 
0.87 
0.93 
0.91 
0.96 
0.96 
0.93 
0.99 
0.95 
0.92 
0.99 
0.91 
0.94 
0.90 
0.93 
0.91 
0.91 
0.78 
0.91 
0.95 
0.96 
0.97 
0.99 
1.00 
0.97 
1.00 
 
0.98 
0.92 
0.98 
0.98 
0.83 
 
1.00 
Note: (*) Banks with data from 8 to 10 years; (**) Banks with data from 5 to 7 years; (***) Banks with data from 2 to 4 
years; (****) Banks with data of only one year.   
ti ,



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Table 9 Determinants of CCR and BCC efficiency ( ) for the Vietnamese banking system  
 Overall technical 
efficiency (CCR) 
Pure technical 
efficiency (BCC) 
C -0.403* 
(-2.254) 
-0.824*** 
(-4.418) 
ROA 1.669** 
(2.082) 
1.712** 
(2.05) 
COA -0.467 
(-1.794) 
-0.348 
(-1.283) 
CITY 0.156*** 
(4.271) 
0.506 
(1.159) 
LNTA 0.079*** 
(6.467) 
0.164 
(1.129) 
LNNLCL -0.012 
(-0.996) 
-0.012 
(-0.928) 
LNBR -0.065*** 
(-4.277) 
-0.064*** 
(-4.012) 
LNAGE -0.096*** 
(-3.454) 
-0.083*** 
(-2.877) 
Observations 379 379 
Note: The variables’ coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) are reported in the table; *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks 
in the period of 1999-2009. 
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